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On étudie dans cet article comment les choix technologiques et les
configurations techniques d'équilibre dépendent premièrement des caractéristiques
de l'industrie (fonctions de demande et paramètres de coûts spécifiques de la
technique multiproduit flexible et de la technique de production, non flexible, de
chaque bien), ainsi que des conditions d'observation des choix des concurrents. On
montre qu'une meilleure observabilité des choix favorise l'émergence de
technologies plus flexibles.
We study in this paper how the technological flexibility choices and
equilibrium configurations depend first on the industry characteristics (demand
function and cost parameters specific to the multiproduct flexible technology and to
the product dedicated technologies) and, second, on the observability conditions
prevailing in the industry. We show that better observability tends to promote the
adoption of more flexible technologies.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Most studies of the adoption of exible technologies assume a two stage
framework in which rms choose rst their type of equipment before
competing for market shares.
1
Between the two stages, each rm can
observe the type of plant adopted by its competitors.
2
That rms can observe the true technology chosen by their competi-
tors is a rather extreme assumption. In many cases these choices are
not fully observed and are, as far as possible, kept secret.
3
In this paper
we rst study the other polar case in which the technological choices are
unobservable. But there exist also intermediate situations. For example
if neither Ford, General Motor or Chrysler seemed to have observed the
kind of factories built up by Nissan and Toyota in the late sixties and
early seventies, the converse was not true. Nissan and Toyota were well
aware of the manufacturing systems of both Ford and GM. Hence we ex-
amine also the case where some rm observes the manufacturing system
of its competitor but not vice versa. Note also that the attractiveness of
non simultaneous moves by the rms, at the technological stage of the
game, is clearly dependent upon the prevailing observability conditions.
There exist many kinds of exibility.
4
In this paper we are interested
by product exibility rather than by volume exibility. We consider two
rms competing for two markets of substitute goods. Each rm may
either adopt a technology nely tuned for producing one good, that is a
dedicated technology (D thereafter), or a exible technology (F in what
follows) for producing the both goods, as in Roller and Tombak (1990).
We compare the equilibrium technological congurations under alter-
native observability conditions and alternative move sequences in the
adoption of technologies by the rms. We show that, broadly speaking,
better observability tends to promote more exible technologies, thus
increasing competitive pressures.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the as-
sumptions on demand and costs and we specify the kinds of game in
which the duopolists could be involved. In section 3 we examine the
case of full observability of the technological choices, in which the pure
1
See Boyer and Moreaux (1997) for a list of such papers.
2
A notable exception is the work of Vives (1989).
3
If an essential feature of the technology is the plant location, as in Eaton and
Schmitt (1994), it is dicult to argue that the choice may be kept wholly secret.
4
See for example Gerwin (1993) for a meticulous classication of the dierent
concepts of exibility.
1
strategy equilibrium never results in a mixed technological conguration
where some rm would choose the F technology whereas its competitor
would adopt a D technology.
5
Section 4 is devoted to the case of un-
observable technological choices. It is precisely in this case and in the
case of asymmetric observability analyzed in section 5 that mixed tech-
nological structures may appear in pure strategy equilibria. We briey
conclude in section 6.
2 THE MODEL
2.1 Demand
On the demand side a representative consumer is assumed to maximize a
separable quadratic utility function: U
 
Q
A
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B

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A
and Q
B
are the quantities of the two dierentiated goods A and B respectively
and I is the quantity of some composite Hicksian good whose price is
normalized to 1. Function U is given by the following where: X; Y 2
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We assume that  > 0 and  >  > 0 so that the goods are sub-
stitutes (closer substitutes as  converges to ). Let p
A
and p
B
be the
prices of goods A and B respectively.
Taking for granted that the income is suciently high, the inverse
demand function or market clearing prices function, p : <
2
+
! <
2
+
; is
5
Clearly, mixed technological structures could appear with positive probability in
mixed strategy equilibria. See Kim, Roller and Tombak (1992).
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2.2 Costs
Each rm may either choose a D technology or the F technology. With
a D technology for good X, a rm may produce good X only, whereas
with the F technology it may compete on both markets. In either case
a technology is characterized by a xed cost and a variable cost. The
xed costs of the D technologies are assumed to be the same, F
D
> 0,
whatever the good to be manufactured, either A or B. The xed cost
of the F technology, F
F
> 0, is higher than the xed cost of the D
technology but lower than the xed costs of operating two D factories:
2F
D
> F
F
> F
D
. As for the variable costs we assume that the marginal
costs are constant, the same for both technologies and the same for both
goods, and equal to c. Hence the cost functions are:
{ either F
D
+ cQ
X
i
, for rm i, if rm i selects the D technology for
producing good X,
{ or F
F
+ c
 
Q
A
i
+Q
B
i

, if rm i chooses the F technology and pro-
duces both goods.
We emphasize the technological choice issues rather than entry pre-
venting issues. Hence we assume that both xed costs F
D
and F
F
are low
3
enough that it is never optimal
6
for a rm to stay out of both markets.
2.3 Game structure, observability and strategies
We consider two rms, indexed by i = 1; 2, which make rst a long run
technological decision and then a short run production decision. Last
market clearing prices are set. Although investment, production out-
lays and revenues do not occur at the same time, we neglect discounting
problems for the sake of simplicity. We examine two kinds of move struc-
ture for the rst technological commitment stage of competition: either
simultaneous moves or sequential moves. For the second or production
stage of the competition, we always assume that the moves are simulta-
neous and that the rms are involved in a Cournot type of competition.
2.3.1 Simultaneous technological move games
Full observability For rm 1 observing the technological decision of
rm 2 before the Cournot stage of the game, a pure strategy is a pair
s
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rst stage of the game;
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set 
1
of such functions:

1
2 
1
) 8 (T
1
; T
2
) 2 T
2
: 
1
(T
1
; T
2
) =
 

A
1
(T
1
; T
2
) ; 
B
1
(T
1
; T
2
)

2 <
2
+
with:
T
1
= D
X
) 
Y
1
(T
1
; T
2
) = 0:
A strategy s
2
is dened in a similar way. Following a well established
tradition
7
we call such strategies, markovian or closed-loop strategies.
We will denote by S
i
the set of closed-loop strategies of rm i observing
the technological decision of its competitor j.
Let 
c`
i
: S ! <; S = S
1
 S
2
; denote the prot function of rm i
6
It is never an equilibrium strategy.
7
At least in dynamic optimization. Clearly the technologies chosen by the rms
are the natural state variables in this model.
4
when both rms play closed-loop strategies:
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where F (T
i
) takes the value F
D
if T
i
is equal to either D
A
or D
B
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the value F
F
if T
i
=F . An equilibrium is a pair of strategies s

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being a best response to the other. An equilibrium s

is subgame perfect
if, for any T 2 T , (
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 functions are
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Complete unobservability For rm i not aware of the technological
decision of its competitor, a pure strategy v
i
is a pair (T
i
; q
i
) where T
i
is
as in the above case and q
i
=
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2 <
2
+
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Y
i
= 0 if T
i
= D
X
;
is the vector of quantities produced, here independant of T
j
, j 6= i. This
kind of strategy is called an open-loop strategy. We will denote by V
i
the
set of open-loop strategies of rm i. Let 
o`
i
: V ! <; V = V
1
 V
2
, be
the prot function of rm i when both rms play open-loop strategies:
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An equilibrium is a pair of strategies v

, each one being a best reply
to the other. Since the technological choices are unobservable there is
no subgame.
Asymmetric observability Suppose last that some rm, say rm 2,
can observe the technological choice of its competitor while the other
rm, rm 1, cannot. In this case rm 1, plays open-loop whereas rm 2
plays closed-loop. Let 
m
i
: V
1
S
2
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t function of rm i:
8 (v
1
; s
2
) 2 V
1
 S
2
:

m
1
(v
1
; s
2
) =
X
X2fA;Bg

p
X
(q
1
+ 
2
(T ))  c

q
X
1
	
  F (T
1
)

m
2
(v
1
; s
2
) =
X
X2fA;Bg

p
X
(q
1
+ 
2
(T ))  c


X
2
(T )  F (T
2
)
	
5
An equilibrium (v

1
; s

2
) is dened in the usual way. We show in the
appendix that in this game there is no subgame.
2.3.2 Sequential technological move games
In this setting, some rm, say rm 1, is moving rst at the technological
choice stage and its choice is observed by rm 2. The technological
choice of rm 2 may in turn either be observed by rm 1 or not, before
the Cournot stage of the game.
Full disclosure of technological choices In case of full disclosure of
the technological commitments, a rm 1's strategy is a pair s
1
= (T
1
; 
1
)
as in the simultaneous technological moves case with full observability,
while a rm 2's strategy is a pair w
2
= (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) where 
2
: T ! T is
its technological choice function, depending upon T
1
, and 
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2 
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its second stage quantity decision function. We will denote by W
2
the
set of rm 2's strategies. In this case too, the strategies are closed-loop
strategies. Let 
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! < be the payo function of rm #i in
this rst Stackelberg game:
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A Nash equilibrium is a pair (s

1
; w

2
) of best responses to each other.
This equilibrium is subgame perfect if:
6
{ rst, for any (T
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2
), the pair of quantity vectors (
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(T ) ; 
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(T )) is
a Cournot equilibrium given the constraints implied by the technological
choices;
{ second, whatever T
1
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) is an equilibrium of the subgame
starting after the technological choice of rm 1.
Unobservability of the technological move of rm 2 Suppose
now that rm 1 cannot observe the type of plant built by rm 2. Con-
trary to the case of simultaneous technological moves with asymmetric
observability, here there exist three subgames, each one starting after the
three dierent technological moves open to rm 1 (See appendix). In or-
der to apply the subgame perfection criterion we must dene a strategy
of rm 1 by specifying not only its actual technological choice and its
actual quantity choice, but also the quantities it would have chosen had
it taken an other decisions at the rst stage; that is we must proceed as
stipulated by game theory and specify the decisions rm 1 would take
at all its information sets, even those not attained as a result of its own
choice at the rst stage of the game. Hence we dene a strategy z
1
of rm 1 as a pair (T
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; !
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The play of the game by rm 1 is rst to choose T
1
at the rst stage
and next !
1
(T
1
) at the second stage whatever the technological choice
of rm 2. We will denote by Z
1
the set of rm 1 strategies. A strategy
of rm 2 is a pair w
2
= (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; 
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) as in the rst Stackelberg game. Let
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rm #i in this second
Stackelberg game. Then:
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An equilibrium (z

1
; w

2
) is a pair of mutual best replies. This equi-
librium is subgame perfect if for any T
1
2 T , the triple
(!
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1
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2
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) ; 
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2
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1
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))) is an equilibrium of the game starting
after T
1
, a game without subgame as shown in Appendix A.3 (see Figure
A.3).
3 THE FULL OBSERVABILITY CASE
Whatever the order of the technological choices at the rst stage of
the competition, the quantity decisions must be a Cournot equilibrium
of the second stage subgame. So let us rst characterize the second
stage equilibria as functions of the rst stage technological choices, before
determining the equilibrium technological conguration of the industry
in the simultaneous technological choices game and in the Stackelberg
game.
3.1 Second stage equilibria and best response tech-
nological choices
Assuming that, if both rms choose dedicated technologies, the tech-
nologies are not dedicated to the same product,
8
we obtain:
{ for T = (D;D), assuming that 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ducing good A, then:
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Clearly choosing technologies dedicated to the same product cannot be an equi-
librium of the whole game, at least as far as only pure strategies are considered, as
in the present paper.
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{ for T = (D;F ), assuming that the dedicated technology chosen by
rm 1 is dedicated to product A, then:
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Taking into account these subgame perfectness conditions, we get the
following prots, as functions of the technological choices made at the
rst stage:
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Denoting by m the dierence    c, that is the maximum mark-up
over variable average cost (equal to marginal cost) which is an index of
the size of the market, by f the dierence F
F
 F
D
between xed costs,
and assuming  = 1,
9
, we get:
{ D is a best response to D, denoted by D = BR
c`
(D), if:
f
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Note that if the slope  of the own quantity coecient in the inverse demand
function are normalized to 1, this implies an adequate unit measure of the Hicksian
generalized good. Under this normalization the maximum mark-up m is the true
indicator of the economic size of the markets.
9
whereas F = BR
c`
(D) if inequality (1) is reversed;
{ F is a best response to F, that is F = BR
c`
(F ), if:
f
m
2

1  
9 (1 + )
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c`
2
() (2)
whereas D = BR
c`
(F ) if inequality (2) is reversed.
The R
c`
1
() and R
c`
2
() functions are illustrated in gure 1.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
3.2 Simultaneous technological choice equilibria
In order to get:
{ a \quasi-symmetric" equilibrium with specialized rms operating D
technologies and producing each one a dierent good, (1) must hold;
{ a symmetric equilibrium with identical multiproduct rms both oper-
ating F technologies, (2) must hold;
{ an asymmetric equilibrium with a specialized rm operating a D fac-
tory and producing only one good, and a multiproduct rm operating
an F technology, both
10
(1) and (2) must hold.
Let us show that we can never have an asymmetric equilibrium. In
order to have such an equilibrium there must exist some values of  and
f
m
2
for which both D = BR
c`
(F ) and F = BR
c`
(D) hold, that is for
which R
c`
2
() <
f
m
2
< R
c`
1
() ; hence the ratio
R
c`
1
()
R
c`
2
()
must be strictly
higher than 1 on some sub-interval of ]0; 1[. But:
R
c`
1
()
R
c`
2
()
=
5
2
+ 12+ 16
4
2
+ 16+ 16
:=
K ()
L ()
and clearly:
R
c`
1
(0)
R
c`
2
(0)
= 1 and lim
!1
R
c`
1
()
R
c`
2
()
=
33
36
< 1
with:
dK
d
= 10+ 12 < 8+ 16 =
dL
d
for  2 ]0; 1[ :
10
(1) means that (1) is not satised.
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Hence the ratio
R
c`
1
()
R
c`
2
()
is decreasing from 1 to
33
36
over the interval ]0; 1[,
implying that R
c`
1
() < R
c`
2
() except for  = 0, so that :
R
c`
1
()
R
c`
2
()
< 1; 8 2 ]0; 1[ : (3)
From the above calculations we may conclude that (see gure 1):
{ either  = 0, that is the markets are separate markets, and either
the ratio of xed cost discrepancy to the maximum mark-up is low

f
m
2
<
1
9

so that, as expected, both rms are ghting on both markets,
operating multiproduct F technologies, or this ratio is high

f
m
2
>
1
9

and each rm operates a dedicated technology thus avoiding direct com-
petition with the other duopolist;
{ or  2 ]0; 1[, that is both markets are inter-linked, and there appears
now some intermediate range of the
f
m
2
ratio,
f
m
2
2
 
R
c`
1
() ; R
c`
2
()

,
on which both (F; F ) and (D;D) may be equilibrium congurations,
whereas for the extreme values of the ratio both rms adopt the same
technologies, that is for
f
m
2
> R
c`
2
(), (D;D) is the sole equilibrium
conguration and, for
f
m
2
< R
c`
1
(), (F; F ) is the unique technological
equilibrium.
In the intermediate range of values for
f
m
2
(zone 2 in gure 1) there
exists a exibility trap. Let (F; F ) be the prot per rm over vari-
able costs under the (F; F ) equilibrium technological conguration and
(D;D) this prot under the (D;D) conguration:
(F; F )
(D;D)
=
2m
2
=9 (1 + )
m
2
= (2 + )
2
=
2
2
+ 8+ 8
9 + 9
:=M ()
For  = 0, then M () = 8=9 and for  = 1; M () = 1. The denomi-
nator is linearly increasing over the range ]0; 1[ whereas the numerator
is increasing and convex. Hence M () < 1, for all  2 ]0; 1[ and prots
over variable costs are higher when the rms are specialized and exploit-
ing separate market segments than both competing over the whole range
of products. Since furthermore the xed cost of a multiproduct technol-
ogy F
F
is higher than the xed cost of a dedicated technology F
D
, then
the (F; F ) equilibrium is denitively less attractive than the (D;D) equi-
librium. The problem is that once a rm adopts an F technology the
other one wishes also adopt the F technology, hence the trap. A similar
11
kind of exibility trap was shown to exist in a volume exibility context
by Boyer and Moreaux (1997).
3.3 Stackelberg equilibria
Let us suppose that the rm moving rst at the technological phase of
the game, is rm 1. Then:
{ either
f
m
2
< R
c`
1
() and in this case F = BR
c`
(F ) = BR
c`
(D), that is
F is a dominant strategy for rm 1, so that the equilibrium technological
conguration is (F; F ) as in the simultaneous moves case;
{ or
f
m
2
> R
c`
2
() and now D = BR
c`
(F ) = BR
c`
(D) meaning that
D is a dominant strategy for rm 1, and the equilibrium technological
conguration is (D;D), again as in the simultaneous moves case;
{ or R
c`
1
() <
f
m
2
< R
c`
2
() and in this case D = BR
c`
(D) and F =
BR
c`
(F ) and since, as shown above, prots are higher under the (D;D)
technological conguration than under the (F; F ) conguration, then the
leader will choose the D technology promoting the (D;D) conguration
and keeping the industry out of the exibility trap.
It is important to notice that the leader and the follower always
choose the same technology at equilibrium, and since the second stage
of the game is a simultaneous move subgame both rms earn the same
prots. We may conclude that under full observability, either the order
of moves is of no consequence, or the sequential moves represent a form
of coordination device working for the benet of the whole industry
and not for the sole benet of some rm with detrimental eects on its
competitor as in the traditional Stackelberg equilibria.
4 THE SECRET TECHNOLOGICAL
CHOICE CASE
We show that if the rst stage technological choices cannot be observed
then there may appear asymmetric equilibria. Let us begin with some
general remarks.
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4.1 Preliminary remarks
Let us suppose now that the rst stage technological choices cannot
be observed and let (v

1
= (T

1
; q

1
) ; v

2
= (T

2
; q

2
)) be some open-loop
equilibrium. Then:
{ either T

i
= D
A
and we must have
@
c`
i
@q
A
i
= 0;
{ or T

i
= F and we must have
@
c`
i
@q
A
i
=
@
c`
i
@q
B
i
= 0;
This implies that (q

1
; q

2
) must be an equilibrium of the second stage
quantity \game", given (T

1
; T

2
). Hence the only pairs of strategies which
may appear as equilibrium strategies are the following three pairs:
i) quasi-symmetric equilibrium:
v

1
=

D; q
A
1
=
  c
2 + 
; q
B
1
= 0

and v

2
=

D; q
A
2
= 0; q
B
2
=
  c
2 + 

ii) symmetric equilibrium:
v

1
=

F; q
A
1
= q
B
1
=
  c
3 ( + )

and v

2
=

F; q
A
2
= q
B
2
=
  c
3 ( + )

iii) asymmetric equilibrium:
v

1
=

D; q
A
1
=
  c
3
; q
B
1
= 0

and
v

2
=

F; q
A
2
=
2   
2 ( + )
  c
3
; q
B
2
=
  c
2 ( + )

It follows that, given a technological conguration of the industry
that is an equilibrium of the open-loop game, the equilibrium prots
accruing to the rms are those payos accruing to them in the closed-
loop game under the same technological conguration. The dierence
between the two information structures lies in the best response test as
we shall see.
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4.2 Quasi-symmetric and symmetric open-loop equi-
libria
Suppose rst that rm 2 is playing the strategy
v
2
=

D; q
A
2
= 0; q
B
2
=
  c
2 + 

. Then rm 1 may play
v
1
=

D; q
A
1
=
  c
2 + 
; q
B
1
= 0

which is its best response to v
2
con-
ditional to having chosen D at the rst stage, and generates prots

1
=

  c
2 + 

2
  F
D
. But had rm 1 chosen T
1
= F rather than D
at the rst stage, then the quantities which would maximize its prof-
its, given the quantities q
A
2
= 0 and q
B
2
=
  c
2 + 
; chosen by rm
2, which are here xed, that is, not dependent upon T
1
, would have
to be q
A
1
=
  c
2 ( + )
and q
B
1
=
 (  c)
2 (2 + ) ( + )
, generating prots

1
=
 (5 + 3) (  c)
2
4 ( + ) (2 + )
2
  F
F
. Thus (D;D) may be the equilibrium
technological conguration of the industry provided that:
f
m
2

1  
4 (1 + ) (2 + )
2
:= R
o`
1
() : (4)
Since:
R
o`
1
()
R
c`
1
()
=
9
5
2
+ 12+ 16
< 1 ; 8 2 ]0; 1[ ; (5)
we conclude that the set of values of the industry parameters for which
(D;D) is an equilibrium is larger in case of unobservability of the tech-
nological choices than in case of full observability.
Suppose next that rm 2 selects the strategy
v
2
=

F; q
A
2
= q
B
2
=
  c
3 ( + )

which would be its choice under full
observability, were (F; F ) be the equilibrium technological conguration
of the industry. The same strategy v
1
=

F; q
A
1
= q
B
1
=
  c
3 ( + )

is
the best response of rm 1 since the above quantities q
A
1
and q
B
1
are
optimized conditional on the choice of T
1
= F . This strategy generates
prots 
1
=
2 (  c)
2
9 ( + )
  F
F
. The other choice of rm 1 is to choose a
dedicated technology. Assuming this dedicated technology is dedicated
to product A, the quantity maximizing its prots, given q
A
2
= q
B
2
=
  c
3 ( + )
not depending here upon T
1
, is q
A
1
=
  c
3
, generating prots
14
1
=
(  c)
2
9
  F
D
. Thus (F; F ) may be the equilibrium technological
conguration of the industry provided that:
f
m
2

1  
9 (1 + )
:= R
o`
2
() = R
c`
2
() := R
2
() (6)
This is the same condition as in the closed-loop case. Thus the (F; F )
conguration may appear at equilibrium for the same range of values
of the industry parameters whether the technological choices are fully
disclosed or held secret.
Note that the ratio
R
o`
1
()
R
2
()
is equal to:
R
o`
1
()
R
2
()
=
9
4 (2 + )
2
< 1 ; 8 2 ]0; 1[ (7)
so that, as in the full observability case, for any  there exists some
range of values of the
f
m
2
ratio,
 
R
o`
1
() ; R
2
()

, for which both types
of equilibria, (D;D) and (F; F ), may appear (see gure 2). For any value
of the substituability index ,  < 1, this range of values of the
f
m
2
ra-
tio for which both congurations (D;D) and (F; F ) may be equilibrium
congurations, is much larger than the corresponding range under full
observability. Since R
o`
2
() = R
c`
2
(), we could conclude that observ-
ability favors the emergence of exible congurations.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
4.3 Asymmetric open-loop equilibria
But it is not the end of the story in the present non-observability con-
text. We must also check whether there exist or not, some values of the
fundamental parameters of the industry for which the pair of strategies:
v
1
=

D; q
A
1
=
  c
3
; q
B
1
= 0

v
2
=

F; q
A
2
=
2   
2 ( + )
  c
3
; q
B
2
=
  c
2 ( + )

;
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could be an equilibrium pair.
Suppose that rm 2 selects the above strategy v
2
. Then rm 1 may
either reply by v
1
above, thus obtaining prots 
1
=
(  c)
2
9
  F
D
,
or choose instead the F technology in which case, given the q
A
2
and q
B
2
components of v
2
not depending here upon T
1
, the quantities maximiz-
ing rm 1's prots are now q
A
1
=
4 + 
4 ( + )
  c
3
and q
B
1
=
  c
4 ( + )
,
generating prots:

1
=
(  c)
2
2 ( + )

4 + 
18
+
1
4 ( + )


2
+
2
3
+

2
6

  F
F
:
Hence choosing the D technology is a best response of rm 1 to v
2
, i:
f
m
2

1  
16 (1 + )
:= R
o`
3
() (8)
Suppose now that rm 1 plays v
1
=

D; q
A
1
=
  c
3
; q
B
1
= 0

. Then
rm 2 may either play the above strategy v
2
, generating prots

2
=
(  c)
2
2 ( + )

1
2 ( + )

 +
2
3
 

2
3

+
2
9
 

9

  F
F
;
or choose a D technology and produce q
A
2
= 0 and q
B
2
=
(3   ) (  c)
6
2
generating prots 
2
=
(3   )
2
(  c)
2
36
  F
D
. Hence choosing the F
technology is the best response of rm 2 to v
1
, i:
f
m
2

(1  ) (  2)
2
36 (1 + )
:= R
o`
4
() (9)
Thus a necessary and sucient condition to have an equilibrium with
both a dedicated and a multiproduct rm is that for some values of 
the ratio
R
o`
3
()
R
o`
4
()
be lower than 1:
R
o`
3
()
R
o`
4
()
=
9
4 (  2)
2
16
with
R
o`
3
(0)
R
o`
4
(0)
=
9
16
< 1 and lim
!1
R
o`
3
()
R
o`
4
()
=
9
4
> 1. Since R
o`
4
() is
strictly increasing over the interval ]0; 1[, then there exists some critical
value  =
1
2
under which this ratio is lower than 1, and above which this
ratio is higher than 1.
We may conclude that, provided the products A and B be not too
good substitutes, that is  < , there exist intermediate values of the
ratio of the xed cost discrepancy to the maximal mark-up,
f
m
2
, for
which, in the open-loop game, a mixed technological conguration may
result in equilibrium.
Let us note also that:
R
o`
4
() =R
2
() = (  2)
2
=4 is decreasing from 1 down to 1=4 over the
interval ]0; 1[,
R
o`
3
() =R
o`
1
() = (2 + )
2
=4 is increasing from 1 up to 9=4 over the
interval ]0; 1[,
R
2
() =R
o`
3
() = 4 > 1 for all  2 ]0; 1[,
R
o`
4
() =R
o`
1
() = (  2)
2
(2 + )
2
=9 is increasing
11
from 8=9 up to 1
over the interval ]0; 1[,
from which we deduce that, for any  2 ]0; 1[, this range of value of the
ratio
f
m
2
for which there exists an asymmetric technological congura-
tion of the industry, is some sub-interval of the range of values for which
both equilibria (D;D) and (F; F ) may appear.
It remains to determine the best technological position. Let us denote
by 
F
(D;F ) and 
D
(D;F ) the prots over variable costs obtained by
the multiproduct rm and the dedicated rm respectively, in the asym-
metric equilibrium conguration of the industry. The ratio of these two
prots is given for  = 1, by:

F
(D;F )

D
(D;F )
=
13  5
4 (1 + )
:
The above ratio is decreasing from
13
4
for  = 0 down to 1 for  = 1,
hence is always higher than 1 over the interval ]0; 1[. Provided that f be
not too high, the multiproduct rm takes the most protable position.
11
We have
d
d
(  2)
2
(2 + )
2
=  2 (  2) (2 + )
2
+2 (  2)
2
(2 + )
2
> 0; for
all  2 ]0; 1[ :
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Next let us remark that:
 (F; F )

D
(D;F )
=
2
1 + 
> 1 and

F
(D;F )
 (F; F )
=
13  5
8
> 1 8  2 ]0; 1[
Hence the ranking of prots over variable costs is the following one:

D
(D;F ) <  (F; F ) <  (D;D) < 
F
(D;F )
This ranking is not aected by the discrepancy of xed costs. We have
 (F; F ) <  (D;D) (see below), 
D
(D;F ) <  (F; F ) if and only if
F is the best response to F in the closed-loop game, and  (D;D) <

F
(D;F ) if and only if F is the best response to D in the closed-loop
game. These two conditions hold over the zone where asymmetric equi-
libria exist.
4.4 The implications of observability
The types of equilibrium technological congurations as functions of
the industry parameters, are illustrated in gure 2. As can be seen
from gures 1 and 2, for any degree of partial substituability, as well
as for independent goods, that is for  2 [0; 1), there exists a whole
range of values of the
f
m
2
index, namely
f
m
2
2
 
R
o`
1
() ; R
c`
1
()

, for
which under full observability the sole equilibrium technological con-
guration is (F; F ), whereas under unobservability both (D;D) and
(D;F )emergence of exibility is easier under full observability than un-
der complete unobservability.
12
.
The switch from an equilibrium conguration to another one result-
ing from the switch from open-loop environments to closed-loop ones is
generally interpreted as a pure strategic eect.
13
If so, we could rephrase
the above results as saying that the pure strategic eect is to promote
the adoption of more exible manufacturing systems.
12
See Boyer, Jacques and Moreaux (1998) for an analysis showing that the observ-
ability has more ambigous implications in a volume exibility context.
13
See for example Vives (1989) for an analysis along these lines.
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5 ASYMMETRICOBSERVABILITYCON-
DITIONS
What happens if rm 1 cannot observe the technological choice made by
rm 2 before playing the Cournot competition stage, while rm 2 is well
aware of the technological choice of its competitor?
5.1 Simultaneous technological move equilibria
Let us consider rst the case of simultaneous technological moves. Since
rm 1 is constrained to select only open-loop strategies, rm 2 has
open-loop best responses, and all the open-loop equilibria are also equi-
libria of this partial observability game. Furthermore since the game
has no subgame, these open-loop equilibria are also subgame perfect
equilibria.
14
But clearly rm 2 could take advantage of its information
and it is dicult to consider the open-loop equilibria as robust equilib-
ria, even if they are subgame perfect. This would imply for example that
an equilibrium, in which rm 2 selects the exible technology and rm 1
the technology dedicated to product A, could be supported by the very
fact that rm 2 would not modify the quantities q
A
2
=
2   
2 ( + )
  c
3
and q
B
2
=
  c
2 ( + )
after having observed that rm 1 has chosen also the
exible technology rather than the dedicated technology as expected. So
let us assume that, for the second stage of the competition, rm 2 use
decision functions 
2
taking full advantage of the information at its dis-
posal. Now, as usual such decision functions 
2
could be implicit threats
which are not credible, even if credibility is not easy to dene in the
present game without sub-game, except in extreme cases. An example
of such an extreme case, in which the implicit threat is clearly not cred-
ible, is a 
2
function selecting excessively large quantities of both goods
when rm 1 chooses the F technology in order to enforce the choice, by
rm 1, of a D technology rather than the F technology. Reasoning along
these lines leads to consider as robust equilibria those equilibria sup-
ported by the strategies of rm 2 whose quantity decision component for
the second stage of the game, results in playing the Cournot equilibrium
quantities conditional to the technological decisions taken by the rms
at the rst stage of the competition. This implies, by a reex eect, that,
14
Open-loop equilibria are also equilibria in the full observability context, but not
subgame perfect ones.
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although rm 1 is playing an open-loop strategy, the true best response
test of its technological choice is the closed-loop test dened by the set
of conditions (1) and (2), since, given the technological choice of rm
2, would rm 1 change its own technological choice, then rm 2 would
consequently change the quantities it sells at the second stage of the
game. Similarly, although rm 2 is playing a closed-loop strategy, the
true best response test of its technological choice is the open-loop test
dened by the set of conditions (4) to (7), since, given the technological
choice of rm 1, would rm 2 modify its own technological choice, then
rm 1 would not change the quantities it sells at the second stage of the
game. This leads to the partioning of the parameter space illustrated in
gure 3 below.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
Comparing the case of complete unobservability with the case of
asymmetric observability there appear three dierences. First in zones
3, 4 and 5, that is for
f
m
2
2
 
R
o`
1
() ; R
c`
1
()

,  2 [0; 1), the (D;D)
conguration is eliminated from the set of equilibria. Second, in zone
3, dened by
f
m
2
2
 
R
o`
4
() ; R
c`
1
()

, for  2
h
0;
1
2

and by
f
m
2
2
 
R
o`
3
() ; R
c`
1
()

, for  2
h
1
2
; 1

, there exists now an asymmetric equi-
librium in which rm 1 adopts the exible technology whereas rm 2
adopts the dedicated technology. Third, in zone 5, dened by
f
m
2
2
 
R
o`
3
() ; R
o`
4
()

and  2
h
0;
1
2

, the asymmetric equilibrium in which
rm 1 were choosing the dedicated technology and rm 2 the exible
one, disappears. On the whole, this asymmetric observability context
is making the emergence of exible manufacturing systems easier than
under complete unobservability context, but less easy than under full
observability. Furthermore, in case of asymmetric equilibrium, the rm
getting the most protable position is the rm which cannot observe the
technological choice of its competitor.
5.2 Stackelberg equilibria
The dierence between the simultaneous move structure and the se-
quential move structure is that, in the sequential choice setting, the rm
moving rst can determine the type of technological conguration of the
industry as in the full observability case. But now there is the additional
20
fact that the rm moving rst is the rm which cannot adapt its pro-
duction decision to the technological choices made at the rst stage of
the competition. For the range of industry parameters where the only
equilibria are equilibria in which both rms choose the same technology,
there is no problem. Firm 1 will determine the equilibrium generating
the highest prot for itself and its competitor, that is, the (D;D) cong-
uration rather than the (F; F ) conguration, thus avoiding the exibility
trap as in the full observability case. But problems could arise in zones
3 and 5. In those zones the equilibria can be either (F; F ) or (F;D).
Hence on the sole observation of rm 1 choosing the F technology, rm
2 cannot infer the type of equilibrium rm 1 is playing. However, in this
case, the (F;D) equilibrium is more protable to rm 1 than the other
equilibrium: (F; F ). Thus rm 2 would have to infer that rm 1 is play-
ing its most protable equilibrium. Since (F;D) is the most protable
equilibrium for rm 1 amongst the two, then in zones 3 and 5 too, these
exists a unique equilibrium in the Stackelberg case under asymmetric
observability.
6 CONCLUSION
We have shown in this paper how the possibility of observing the tech-
nological choices made by competitors aect rms' strategies and equi-
librium technological congurations in industries characterized other-
wise by six dierent parameters. We proposed a two stage two market
framework where the choice of technologies, either dedicated or exible,
typically long term choices, are made in the rst stage and production
decisions, typically short term choices, are made in the second stage.
We considered three dierent observability environments: an open-loop
context where rms do not observe technological choices, a closed-loop
one where they do observe those choices, and nally an asymmetric ob-
servability case where one rm observes and the other does not. In each
case, we dened the strategies available to rms, we characterized best
response functions and we rigourously derived and analyzed the equi-
libria. We can summarize our most important global result as follows:
better observability tends to promote the adoption of more exible tech-
nologies. However, in the case of asymmetric observability, we showed
that the most protable position is that of the rm not observing its
competitor's technology. Also, we identied an industry parameter re-
gion in the (;
f
m
2
){space where a exibility trap appears: rms may
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nd themselves trapped in a exible equilibrium (F; F ) while they would
both be better o in the alternative (D;D) equilibrium; this trap could
be avoided, under the closed-loop and asymmetric observability environ-
ments, if the rst stage technological choices are sequential (with the
informed rm moving second in the asymmetric case) rather than si-
multaneous. Moreover, as gures 1, 2 and 3 clearly suggest, the paths
industries would follow in adopting exible technologies as the market
size index increases (as m increases, that is, as
f
m
2
decreases), as the
investment cost of exible technologies decreases (as f decreases, that
is, as
f
m
2
decreases), or as the coecient of substitutability increases
(as  decreases) dier signicantly between the dierent observability
environments.
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7 APPENDIX: GAME TREES AND
STRATEGIES
For reasons of simplicity, we will assume in this appendix that the ded-
icated technology is dedicated to product A and that only two dierent
quantities of each product X , X 2 fA;Bg, can be manufactured, q
X
and bq
X
, both positive, whatever the technology used, provided that the
good can be produced with this technology.
7.1 Complete unobservability
Suppose that neither rm 1 nor rm 2 may observe the technological
choice of its competitor before the quantity stage of the competition.
The tree of this game is illustrated in gure A.1 below. On this gure
and the other gures of this appendix we denote as follows the moves at
the second stage information sets of a rm following its choice of the F
technology at the rst stage:
For rm 1:
I =
 
q
A
1
; q
B
1

; II =
 
q
A
1
; bq
B
1

; III =
 
bq
A
1
; q
B
1

and IV =
 
bq
A
1
; bq
B
1

For rm 2:
1 =
 
q
A
2
; q
B
2

; 2 =
 
q
A
2
; bq
B
2

; 3 =
 
bq
A
2
; q
B
2

and 4 =
 
bq
A
2
; bq
B
2

Clearly, there is no subgame in this game.
[INSERT FIGURE A.1 HERE]
Suppose that rm 1 chooses the open-loop strategy T
1
= D and q
A
1
whereas rm 2 chooses the open-loop strategy T
2
= F and
 
bq
A
2
; bq
B
2

that
is 4 at the second stage according to the above notations. The implied
moves at the dierent information sets are drawn by heavy lines on the
gure. The actual play of the game is this unique path going from the
origin of the tree to a terminal node. What is to be noticed here is that
these so called open-loop strategies are reduced from strategies. The
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canonical form of a strategy in an extensive form game, as dened by
Selten (1975), the main reference on this subject, is to specify the choices
elected by the player at all its information sets, even at those informa-
tion sets which are not attained given the choices made at preceeding
information sets. Clearly here the open loop strategy of rm 2 does
not specify what rm 2 would produce, had it chosen the D technology
rather than the F one. Note also that open-loop strategies cannot be
seen as strategies specifying implicitely that the rm would choose the
same quantities at all the information sets where it must choose quanti-
ties. A rm i having chosen an open-loop strategy T
i
= F , q
A
i
> 0 and
q
B
i
> 0 cannot be reputed choosing the same quantities at its informa-
tion sets (not attained) following the choice (not made) of the dedicated
technology.
7.2 Simultaneous technological moves and partial ob-
servability
Suppose now that rm 1 cannot observe the technological choice of rm
2 while rm 2 is informed of the technological move of rm 1 before the
Cournot stage of the competition, both rms moving simultaneous at
the rst technological stage. The tree of this game is illustrated in gure
A.2 below. It is easy to check that this game has no subgame.
[INSERT FIGURE A.2 HERE]
7.3 Sequential technological moves and partial ob-
servability
Suppose last that rm 1 chooses its technology rst, then rm 2 observing
the move of rm 1 chooses its own technology and rm 1 cannot observe
the technological move of rm 2 before the Cournot stage of the game.
The tree of this game is similar to the tree illustrated in the above gure,
excepted that the rst information set of the rm 2 is split into two
information sets, one for each node as illustrated in gure A.3. There
appear now two sub-games each one following the dierent technological
moves of rm 1.
[INSERT FIGURE A.3 HERE]
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